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The central controversy over embryonic stem cell research
involves the sacrifice of human preimplantation stage blasto-
cysts in order to derive human embryonic stem cell (hESC) lines.
From an ethical perspective, this controversy is rooted in deter-
mining whether the blastocyst stage embryo is considered
a ‘‘person,’’ the moral equivalent of one of us, who has a right
not to be killed unjustly. The philosophical literature, both ancient
and contemporary, contains much discussion about what char-
acteristics or attributes are essential to personhood: candidates
include consciousness, self-consciousness, rationality, and
sentience. Various philosophical arguments have been made
as to when during human development these capacities arise
and personhood is attained. Some scholars suggest that, given
the difficulty of coming to agreement about the properties that
are necessary for personhood and the inability to link these
capacities to a particular developmental stage, it makes sense
to say that the human zygote is a person. Others have suggested
that humans do not become persons until well after birth, when
the capacities associated with personhood are obvious. Many
have argued that it may be more sensible to acknowledge that
the beginnings of personhood arise sometime in between. In
The Morality of Embryo Use, Louis Guenin attempts to move
beyond these established arguments and provides a different
case in support of the humanitarian use of embryos in research.
It is important for scientists and policy makers who are grappling
with questions about federal funding for stem cell research to
understand the range of philosophical arguments outlined
above. Strong public support for hESC research is dependent
upon building consensus, and providing a philosophical basis
for such a consensus is one of the goals of Guenin’s book.
Despite the importance of bringing scientists and philoso-
phers together to address the ethical issues associated with
the use of embryos in research, each community predominantly
writes for its own constituency and little effort has been made at
cross-fertilization. The Morality of Embryo Use, unfortunately,
carries on this tradition. Though its focus is a novel argument
in support of the use of human embryos for stem cell research
and though it succeeds at comprehensively analyzing a wide
range of arguments, both pro and con, the book is written in phil-
osophical language, directed to philosophers, and it seems likely
that most biologists will find it challenging at best.
In his book, Guenin’s central argument proposes the term
‘‘epidosembryos’’ (‘‘after the Greek epidosis for an Athenian’s
beneficence to the common weal’’) to refer to human embryos
created outside of the body and donated expressly for research
and not for transference to the uterus, human or artificial. The
epidosembryos could be the embryos not needed by couples
using assisted reproductive technologies or they could begenerated de novo from donated eggs and sperm. The key facet
of the definition is that, by virtue of being extracorporeal, epido-
sembryos are nonenabled, and thus, their plight is under the
control of their donors. These embryos could not accidentally
implant in a uterus, as it would take a significant intervention to
achieve such a result. In this sense, the epidosembryos are
distinct from typically generated embryos that may or may not
implant into a uterus in the course of their development without
intervention. Thus, if we identify extra embryos in this way, the
arguments against their use in humanitarian research shifts
from whether their moral status precludes their destruction to
whether there is a duty to implant them.
Those who argue that personhood begins at fertilization
implicitly recognize the distinction between enabled and nonen-
abled embryos and believe there should be intervention to
enable any extra in vitro embryos via ‘‘adoption.’’ A recent study
poses some difficulties to the idea of adoption, however, as
a majority of people who have produced excess embryos are
not willing to have them implanted in other women’s bodies
(Lyerly et al., 2008). With the alternatives being eternal frozen
storage or destruction, the argument from beneficence for their
use in research becomes a strong one, given the potential of
hESC research to ease pain and suffering when therapies are
developed. It is less likely, however, that individuals who support
zygotic personhood would be in favor of generating embryos for
research purposes, though Guenin makes some strong argu-
ments against zygotic personhood and in support of choosing
to donate gametes as well as embryos for hESC research.
Guenin sensitively assesses arguments for zygotic person-
hood and in the end maintains that the argument from species-
partiality—that because the embryo is human it ought to be
respected—is not strong enough to generate a duty to transfer
an embryo to a uterus. But, he also rejects what he calls the
Non-Individuation Argument (NA), an argument that he claims
many scientists think ‘‘clinches the case’’ for embryo use. The
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days in humans, early embryos can sometimes split and give rise
to monozygotic twins. Therefore, according to the NA, person-
hood cannot occur until after this stage. Guenin claims from
a number of points of view, some more convincing than others,
that theNA holds little weight. He does, however, omit a scientific
controversy that is currently being cited by both sides in the
debate over the morality of hESC research. That is, develop-
mental biologists have yet to resolve whether or not a prepattern
exists in the zygote and in cleavage stagemammalian embryos. If
such pre-patterning is present, and blastomeres are specialized
prior to the blastocyst stage, this detail would support the exis-
tence of a single entity as early as the zygote stage. In contrast,
the absenceof aprepatternand the totipotencyof individual blas-
tomereswould provide evidence against the existence of a single
entity at these early stages. Unfortunately, clarity on this issue
cannot, at present, beobtained from the scientific literature, since
experimental results that either support or oppose a prepattern
have both been reported (Hiiragi et al., 2006; Zernicka-Goetz,
2006). Given this controversy, it may be premature to completely
dismiss the NA, even while recognizing that science may not be
able to determine an answer to an ethical debate. When person-
hood begins is ultimately a philosophical, not biological, ques-
tion. Guenin also explores religion-based arguments, focusing
only on the Christian and predominantly Catholic viewpoints,
albeit with great clarity.
In general, Guenin is clearly in command of the relevant
science. Sometimes his desire to be specific in clarifying
concepts leads to formal logical equation building, which
complicates rather than clarifies the arguments. Furthermore,
at least one line of reasoning that supports hESC research is
missing. That is, by generating an ESC line, that particular geno-
type can, at least theoretically, be preserved indefinitely. Based
on studies performed in mice, ESCs can be manipulated to give
rise to an entire embryo, and subsequent organism, if combined
with tetraploid embryos that can only contribute to extraembry-
onic trophectoderm (Nagy et al., 1993). Thus, generation of an
hESC line that can be frozen indefinitely may provide that geno-
type with a form of immortality, should the tetraploid comple-
mentation strategy be adapted to the human system.
Achieving recognition and broad usage of the term epidosem-
bryos, and all it entails, may prove to be problematic, as have114 Cell Stem Cell 4, February 6, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.other attempts to define subclasses of embryos. The term pre-
embryo was used transiently not long ago, largely in an attempt
to distinguish preimplantation stages from postimplantation
stages that begin to resemble a fetus/baby, thereby making its
use in research more palatable. An embryo changes in appear-
ance dramatically during development and does not readily fit
a single morphological description. For example, at the cleavage
stage, it is an aggregate of loosely associated cells, while at the
blastocyst stage, two cell types are clearly present, as various
extraembryonic structures, like the placenta, begin to form. It
is also reasonable to attempt to make a distinction, as Guenin
does, between embryos based upon their mode of production
and ultimately their use. The epidosembryo concept may be
worth a try.
Some stem cell biologists hope that a better understanding of
reprogramming events will allow us to generate patient-specific
iPSCs from adult tissues that can be used effectively in the clinic
and eliminate the need for hESCs. Most scientists would agree
that the field has yet to realize this goal and that experimentation
with human embryos remains essential for the development of
successful therapies and understanding disease progression.
There is, therefore, a real need to move toward consensus on
human embryo research, and here, Guenin makes an important
contribution. His book indicates how such a consensus might be
achieved by using the concept of epidosembryos, which were
never intended for reproduction. He stresses that it is possible
for common ground to be found, allowing hESC research to
potentially contribute to a long term humanitarian goal, by easing
pain and suffering.
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